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Symposium Article
Gendering the Law of Occupation: The Case of
Cyprus
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin
Abstract
The long-term occupation of Northern Cyprus provides some
valuable insights into the gendered dimensions of the law of
occupation. Specifically, close analysis of conflict-related
patterns of sexual violence, the regulation of family relationships,
and the challenge of sexual trafficking allows for a broader
reassessment of the extent to which occupation law is ‘fit for
purpose’ specifically as it regulates long-term transformative
occupations. The law of occupation, in its original
conceptualization, was assumed to have a short-term and
utilitarian function, designed for the protection of land and
people until the disputed territory was returned to its rightful
sovereign. Long-term and belligerent territorial control of
occupied territory has meant expanded patterns of exclusions and
under-enforcement of law for women, and in particular
illustrates the opaque under-regulation of the private sphere
under occupation, generally to the detriment of women’s
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protection and entitlements. This article exposes those gendered
tensions with a focus on one case-study but with broader reach to
multiple sites of occupation.
INTRODUCTION
The law of occupation can rightly be considered a highly
specialized sub-division of the law of armed conflict.1 Its
genealogy is long, and its content, like much of the law that
regulates the conduct of hostilities between states or between
state and non-state actors, is routine, pedantic, and highly
ritualized.2 Despite its long history, the law of occupation has
received much less scholarly and policy attention than other
parts of the law regulating war. While the law of armed conflict
has historically ignored the experiences and challenges faced by
women—whether as civilians or combatants—in situations of
armed conflict, the law of occupation has been distinctly bereft
of scholarly and policy interest.3 Thus, there is little sustained
legal analysis of women’s rights, obligations and challenges
under occupation as well as no lasting analysis of the structural
limits and gender capture of the law of occupation.4 This article
addresses that gap with a focus on the long-term occupation of
Northern Cyrus by Turkish forces, emphasizing the experiences
of women during hostilities and the ongoing occupation. Based
on fieldwork conducted in Cyprus in the autumn of 2016, the
article draws on interview data, field observations, and
secondary sources. Section I of the article addresses the history
of the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. Section II outlines
the protracted process of peace negotiations on the Island, and
1. Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and
Answers, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/
eng/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm.
2. See, e.g., id.; International law on the conduct of hostilities: overview,
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/warand-law/conduct-hostilities/overview-conduct-of-hostilities.htm
(discussing
various dimensions of the applicable law of occupation).
3. Judith Gardam, Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the
Silence?, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 55 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Jody M. Prescott, NATO Gender Mainstreaming and the
Feminist Critique of the Law of Armed Conflict, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 83
(2013); CHARLOTTE LINDSEY, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WOMEN FACING
WAR, 22 (2002); JUDITH GARDAM, A New Frontline for Feminism and
International Humanitarian Law, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 217–32 (Margaret Davies & Vanessa Munro eds.,
2013) (discussing gender and the law of armed conflict generally).
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the consistent failure to reach a comprehensive peace settlement
among the parties. The failure to substantively include women
in the negotiation process, as well as the lack of a gender
dimension to the negotiation content, is also highlighted. The
article then proceeds to Section III, outlining the history of
gendered violence during and after the invasion of the Island.
This sets the stage to discuss the gendered exclusions that shape
women’s experiences of the occupation since 1974 in Section IV.
Here, the focus is on private and family life, demonstrating how
the law of occupation fails to regulate the private sphere, thereby
creating significant regulatory gaps for women. The lack of
regulation is compounded by the transformative and sustained
nature of the occupation impinging on every aspect of public and
private life. In exposing the centrality of the public/private
divide to the structure of occupation law, the article underscores
the exclusion and marginalization experienced by women living
under occupation. Section V concludes the substantive analysis
by addressing the ongoing complexity of violence and harm
against women in the occupied territory, with a focus on
trafficking under occupation. The gaps in the regulatory scope of
the fourth Geneva Convention allied with the lack of
international recognition for the territory demonstrate the ways
in which the limits of the law itself can be a grave impediment
to engaging the rights and protections due to women during
occupation.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
The Cyprus Occupation formally began on July 20, 1974,
when Turkish forces, citing the Treaty of Guarantee under the
London and Geneva Agreements of 1959–1960 and in response
to a Greek junta-supported coup to topple the elected President
of the Republic of Cyprus, invaded the Island to ostensibly
protect the Turkish Cypriots. By August 15th Turkey occupied
thirty-seven percent of territory in the Northeastern part of the
Island of Cyprus.5 During the invasion, the forces expelled Greek
Cypriots from the North and took “effective control” of that part
of the Island.6 Immediately after the invasion, the U.N. Security
5. David Wippman, International Law, Ethnic Conflict, and the Example
of Cyprus, 22 CORNELL L.F. 9, 10 (1995).
6. PANKYPRIOS DIKĒGORIKOS SYLLOGOS, EUROPEAN COMM’N H.R.,
HUMAN RIGHTS: TURKEY’S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CYPRUS:
FINDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONTINUING
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Council adopted a resolution that called for “all states to respect
the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of
Cyprus” and called for “an immediate end to foreign
intervention” from the Island.7 Based on the resolution, the
governments of Britain, Greece, and Turkey engaged in talks for
the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the preservation of
Cypriot sovereignty.8 Following differences in opinion over the
reunification of Cyprus, Turkey broke off negotiations on August
14, 1974, and has since held a third of the Island.9 This
occupation continues to provoke condemnation and Turkey
remains the only country to recognize the subsequent formation
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) within the
occupied area.10 The terminology of occupation is somewhat
fraught on the Island; anecdotally, during fieldwork, I was told
that a singular preoccupation with the occupation
characterization of conflict involves narrative complexities
which overplay who was a victim and who was a perpetrator in
the conflict,11 emphasizing externalities rather than on the bicommunal nature of co-existence challenges and broader issues
of discrimination and equality between Greek and Turkish
VIOLATIONS BY TURKEY ¶ 8 (1986) (estimating that 140,000-200,000 Greek
Cypriots were removed from Northern Cyprus immediately or right after the
occupation started, among whom thousands were wounded and many were
missing); JAMES KER-LINDSAY, THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 41–42 (2011); Eugene Rossides, Cyprus and the Rule of Law,
17 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 21, 24 (1991) (discussing that the United Nation
Committee for Missing Persons has worked to identify the remains of missing
persons); Northern Cyprus, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Northern_Cyprus (lasted visited Oct. 29, 2017) (“Northern Cyprus extends from
the tip of the Karpass Peninsula in the northeast to Morphou Bay, Cape
Kormakitis and its westernmost point, the Kokkina exclave in the west. Its
southernmost point is the village of Lourouijna.”).
7. S.C. Res. 353, ¶ 1–3 (July 20, 1974). See also S.C. Res. 353, U.N. SCOR,
29th Sess., 1781st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/11350 (July 20, 1974).
8. David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31
TEX. INT’L L.J. 141, 145 (1996).
9. Id. at 147.
10. See Rossides, supra note 6, at 25–26.
11. This terminology is used largely by nationalist Greek Cypriots, and not
by Turkish Cypriots. There is also a discourse around two occupations—the first
‘occupation of the government’ followed by military occupation by the Turks.
More recently, tensions in Northern Cyprus have taken on another layer, as
secular Cypriot Turks are chafing under the increased Islamic emphasis from
Turkey. As McGarry points out, “[f]or Turkish Cypriots to abandon their single
region would be to jeopardize not just collective self-determination, but their
security, and would be seen as a step backward, reviving their traumatic
memories of being enclaved.” John McGarry, Centripetalism, Consociationalism
and Cyrus: The “Adoptability” Question, 65 POL. STUD. 512, 523 (2017).
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Cypriots. As in every ethno-national conflict, there exist
different and often competing narratives and the case of Cyprus
is no exception.
The territory is distinctly divided by a physical buffer zone
(called the demilitarized zone or “Green Line”), which is manned
both militarily and electronically by military personnel from the
Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot soldiers (bolstered by
Turkish military personnel).12 The ceasefire lines extend
approximately 180 miles and cover about three percent of the
Island.13 A United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) has been deployed to Cyprus under United Nations
Security Council Resolution 186 since March 1964, with troop
levels broadly held around 850.14 The UNFICYP maintains a
surveillance system through observation posts many of which
involve electronic surveillance, complicated by the absence of a
formal
ceasefire
agreement
between
the
parties.15
Approximately 30,000–35,000 Turkish troops are estimated to
be currently occupying the territory of Northern Cyprus.16
Access to either side required passing through a security and
passport checkpoint. The conflict can be described as “frozen,”
where despite high levels of political engagement from multiple
actors over many decades, territorial and political antagonisms
have remained static.17 The inter-communal exchange is limited
12. See About the Buffer Zone, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN
CYPRUS, https://unficyp.unmissions.org/about-buffer-zone (last visited Oct. 30,
2017).
13. Id.
14. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, U.N. PEACEKEEPING
FORCE IN CYPRUS: ABOUT, https://unficyp.unmissions.org/about (last visited
Oct. 30, 2017).
15. A. Walter Dorn, Electronic Eyes on the Green Line: Surveillance by the
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 29 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC.
184, 185, 188 (2014).
16. Renewed Cyprus Talks Set to Begin in Switzerland, AL JAZEERA (June
27, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/renewed-cyprus-talks-setswitzerland-170627175135875.html (discussing that “[t]erritory, property,
governance and power-sharing were ‘make or break’ issues” and that “[t]he two
sides have also been diametrically opposed on security, especially the presence
of about 30,000 Turkish troops in northern Cyprus.”). See also Arthur Beesley
& Kerin Hope, Cyprus Rivals Restart Talks over Reuniting Island, FIN. TIMES
(June
25,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/ad4494c4-599f-11e7-b553e2df1b0c3220 (“The presence of up to 35,000 Turkish troops Cyprus remains
the most contentious question. After talks in January Turkey’s president Recep
Tayyip Erdogan insisted on his country’s right to maintain troops in Cyprus ‘for
ever.”).
17. See McGarry, supra note 11, at 513 (“Cyprus is a partitioned polity
which currently lacks any common power-sharing institutions. Indeed, no
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and fraught on both sides.18 Over the decades, however, many
inter-ethnic contacts and conflict resolution groups have worked
together on different projects and produced alternative
narratives and documents to the official discourse across the
divide. Not coincidentally, the membership of these groups has
been dominated by women.19
Membership of the European Community has been
singularly important not only in shaping peace negotiations but
also in defined debates concerning citizenship and identity on
the Island.20 Both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are
considered European Union (EU) citizens, but ‘settlers’ to
Turkish occupied Cyprus are not entitled to European identity
cards.21 Because of the continued division of Cyprus, however,
Turkish Cypriots have little voice within the EU and are not
represented within the Cypriot delegation.22 In addition to its
representation in the EU, the Cypriot delegation is also entitled
to nominate three representatives and three substitutes to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.23 Within this
functioning common institutions have existed in Cyprus since its consociational
arrangements collapsed in December 1963, 11 years before Turkey’s partition
in 1974.”).
18. During my fieldwork, I attended a major but unusual inter-communal
event that was the presentation of the play Antigone in an old Roman
amphitheatre in the North. Dozens of buses and cars departed from the town of
Nicosia taking attendants to this cultural event. Notably, attendance in this bicommunal cultural event was critiqued by nationalist and conservative Greek
Cypriot commentators. See Angelos Anastasiou, Cypriots, foreigners pack
Salamina Theatre Amid Criticism, CYPRUS MAIL ONLINE (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/09/29/cypriots-foreigners-pack-salamina-theatreamid-criticism/.
19. One such project is the Home of Cooperation in the buffer zone between
the two sides in Nicosia which houses the Bicommunal NGO the Association of
Historical Dialogue and Research. See Maria Hadjipavlou, The “Crossings”
along the Divide: The Cypriot Experience, in THE WALLS BETWEEN CONFLICT
AND PEACE 197–216 (Alberto Gasparini ed., 2017); Maria Hadjipavlou, Cypriot
Citizens’ Peacebuilding Efforts towards Reconciliation, 19(1) AUSTRIAN REV. OF
INT’L & EURO. L. 133 (2017).
20. Andreas Rinke & Gulsen Solaker, Cyprus Remains Stumbling Block in
Turkey’s EU Ambition: Merkel, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2013 1:05 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-eu/cyprus-remainsstumbling-block-in-turkeys-eu-ambition-merkel-idUSBRE91O10L20130225.
21. Cyprus, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/coun
tries/member-countries/cyprus_en (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
22. Internet to Inform the Turkish Cypriots on European Union Matters,
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO THE U.N. (Mar. 9, 1999)
http://www.cyprusun.org/?p=159.
23. PACE: Relations with Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe,
TURKISH REPUBLIC OF N. CYPRUS: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.,
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delegation, the Council of Europe has granted two seats to Greek
Cypriots and one seat to Turkish Cypriots.24 Despite this
allotment, the current Cyprus delegation only includes two
Greek Cypriot representatives and two substitutes.25 There have
been repeated attempts, namely after the Greek Cypriots voted
against ratifying negotiations, to work more closely with the
Turkish Cypriot community and include them in debates on
European Political affairs, but none have come to fruition.26
Despite the lack of progress on comprehensive settlement of
the conflict, legal challenges to the occupation have framed the
ways in which the occupier discharges its legal obligations. Much
of this litigation has taken place at the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR). For example, in Loizidou v. Turkey
(1996), the ECtHR ruled that Turkey was responsible for
violating the rights of Greek Cypriots who were displaced during
the 1974 Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus.27 In XenidesArestis v. Turkey (2005) the ECtHR found that the remedies put
in place by the TRNC, following the Loizidou decision, were
inadequate to address such property claims.28 The ECtHR
ordered Turkey to introduce a remedy for effective redress.29 In
response, the TRNC passed Law 67/2005 Compensation,
Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties, which
created the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) as a means
of settling such property disputes.30 The IPC officially began its
http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/foreign-policy/international-organisations/council-ofeurope/pace/ (lasted visited Oct. 30, 2017).
24. Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1113 ¶ 10 (Jan. 29, 1997).
25. “Elected Representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community” Will Be
Able to Sit in the Chamber, COUNCIL OF EUR. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY:
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2004), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.
asp?newsid=331&lang=2. See also Cyprus, COUNCIL OF EUR. PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY, http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/AL-XML2HTM
L-EN.asp?lang=en&XmlID=NationalDelegation-cy (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
26. See, e.g., Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1376 (Apr. 29, 2004); Eur. Parl. Ass. Res.
1628 (Oct. 1, 2008).
27. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2236.
28. Xenides Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec.
22, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-71800.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Nasia Hadjigeorgiou, Remedying Displacement in Frozen
Conflict: Lessons from the Case of Cyprus, 18 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL
STUD. 152, 158–59 (2016) (“[T]he Commission is an organ that is clouded in
secrecy, which creates difficulties if one’s objective is to examine its practical
effectiveness . . . . Few applicants openly admit that they have gone to the IPC
because those who do are labelled among many in the GC community as
‘traitors,’ as collaborating with the ‘enemy’ and selling their patrimonial land
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activities on March 17, 2006. In Demopoulos v. Turkey (2010),
the ECtHR ruled that the IPC was an effective local remedy that
must be exhausted before claims can be brought before the
ECtHR.31
II. HISTORY OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN CYPRUS
The European Union, the Council of Europe, and the United
Nations have made ongoing efforts to bring about a negotiated
settlement in the Cypriot conflict. Since the start of the
occupation, international actors have also put pressure on
Turkey to withdraw forces and recognize the legitimacy of the
Cypriot government.32 In addition, throughout Cypriot history,
the United Nations (U.N.) has played an active role in
preserving peace and relations between the two communities.33
Since 1964, citing their Article 2 (4) obligations under the U.N.
Charter and to preserve peace between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities, the U.N. has maintained a peacekeeping
force on the Island.34 These efforts represent the largest direct
intervention that international actors have made in Cyprus.35
Since the start of the occupation, the UNFICYP has repeatedly
for financial gain.”). Contra Elena Katselli Proukaki, The Right of Displaced
Persons to Property and to Return Home after Demopoulos, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
701, 702–03 (2014) (arguing that the decisions of European Court of Human
Rights only provide a framework on property and not a resolution of the thornier
issues); Rhodri C. Williams & Ayla Gürel, The European Court of Human Rights
and the Cyprus Property Issues: Charting a Way Forward 1 (PEACE RES. INST.
OSLO CYPRUS CTR., Paper 1/2011), https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.
ashx?id=388&type=publicationfile (“[T]he decisions of the Court serve only to
define the outer parameters within which the parties have a degree of political
space to arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise. In seeking to contribute
to a better appreciation of these parameters, we maintain that the Court’s
recent judgments do no more—and no less—than to exclude the more extreme
aspects of the proposals that have been put forward by both sides.”).
31. Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365.
32. See, e.g., Resolution on Cyprus, EUR. PARL. O.J. (C 117) 15 1996
(encouraging Turkey to allow greater European access to Northern Cyprus);
Motion for a Resolution to Wind up the Debate on the Statement by the VicePresident of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy on Turkish Actions Creating Tensions in the
Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus (2014/2921(RSP)), EUR. PARL. DOC. B80211/2014 (2014) (calling Turkey to recognize Cypriot sovereignty as a matter
of international law).
33. S.C. Res. 186, ¶ 4 (Feb. 27, 1964).
34. Id.
35. See Norrie MacQueen, The UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 5 CABLE
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.cablemagazine.scot/cyprus/.
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shifted its strategies to maintain the ceasefire line and preserve
the existing peace with the final goal of reaching a resolution for
foreign troop withdrawal.36 The ceasefire line was drawn in 1974
and remains frozen in time.37 The UNFICYP forces are currently
active in Cyprus and have stated that they plan to remain active
until an agreement between the two Cypriot communities is
reached.38 A status of force agreement has been consistently
renewed to maintain the presence of peacekeeping troops on the
Island.39 Over the years, the UNFICYP has negotiated “mini”
agreements with the respective militaries to lower the potential
for an unexpected escalation of military tensions; the
agreements include patrolling of the demilitarized zone,
demarcating the zone, and installing CCTV cameras and
electronic surveillance with agreed access to de-escalate or
prevent firefights among the trigger-happy sentries placed by
the military authorities on both sides.40
In addition to its work through the UNFICYP, the U.N. has
also facilitated peace talks between the two sides. In 1999, the
U.N. Security Council called upon the two sides “to work
constructively” with the Secretary-General to reach a
comprehensive peace agreement.41 This culminated in an
agreement in 2004, known as the “Comprehensive Settlement of
the Cyprus Problem.”42 The plan called for the withdrawal of
Turkish troops, resettlement for displaced persons during the

36. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 365, ¶ 4 (Dec. 13, 1974); S.C. Res. 1251, ¶ 8 (June 29,
1999) (reiterating UNFICYP role in preserving peace at ceasefire line); S.C. Res.
1486, ¶ 3 (May 27, 2003) (extending civilian troops to ease restrictions on
civilian restrictions on travel across the ceasefire).
37. See About the Buffer Zone, supra note 12.
38. See S.C. Res. 2234, ¶ 7 (July 29, 2015).
39. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1847 (Dec. 12, 2008); S.C. Res. 1873 (May 29, 2009);
S.C. Res. 1898 (Dec. 14, 2009); S.C. Res. 1930 (June 15, 2010); S.C. Res. 1953
(Dec. 14, 2010); S.C. Res. 1986 (June 13, 2011); S.C. Res. 2026 (Dec. 14, 2011);
S.C. Res. 2058 (July 19, 2012); S.C. Res. 2089 (Jan. 24, 2013); S.C. Res. 2114
(July 30, 2013); S.C. Res. 2135 (Jan. 30, 2014); S.C. Res. 2168 (July 30, 2014);
S.C. Res. 2197 (Jan. 29, 2015); S.C. Res. 2234 (July 29, 2015); S.C. Res. 2263
(Jan. 28, 2016); S.C. Res. 2300 (July 26, 2016) (each resolution extending the
mandate for six months at a time, evidencing the solution’s highly impermanent
nature to a quasi-permanent peacekeeping presence).
40. Interview with U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFICYP)
personnel that the author wishes to keep anonymous. Sources verified by the
Journal. (Sept. 28, 2016).
41. S.C. Res. 1250, ¶ 8 (June 29, 1999).
42. UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan of the Cyprus Question (Mar. 31,
2004), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/un-comprehensive-settlement-plan-of-the-cyprusquestion.en.mfa.
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original period of conflict, the citizenship of Turkish immigrants,
and a strengthening of a bizonal character of a unified Cyprus.43
The Security Council unanimously adopted the proposal and
gave their full support to the negotiated settlement.44 The
European Parliament, with the Cypriot ascension into the EU
looming, also voiced unequivocal support of the plan and stated
that it could serve as a “shining example for handling . . .
difficult international issues.”45 Ultimately, the resolution failed
after Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly voted against the
agreement.46
Four years later, in September 2008, the Secretary-General
assisted the two Cypriot communities in negotiating another
comprehensive settlement.47 The settlement focused on a
reduction in military exercises, freedom of civilian movement
between the two sides of the federation, and reduced tensions
along the green line.48 Some have attributed the failure of this
negotiation to the world recession and the changing economic
conditions in Cyprus, which limited tolerance for a peace deal
with considerable economic costs.49 Since these talks, there have
been further efforts to negotiate a settlement, but none have yet
reached a solution.50 At the time of writing this Article, the peace
talks are currently at a stand-still.51 The parties remain unable
to reach an agreement, despite the “shuttle diplomacy” efforts
provided by the Special Adviser of the U.N. Secretary-General
on Cyprus, Mr. Espen Barth Eide, during the last round of
43. Id. at annex 4, art. 3; arts. 7(3), 3, 2(1)(a).
44. S.C. Res. 1475, ¶ 4 (Apr. 14, 2003).
45. EUR. PARL. DOC. (P5_TA) 0347 (2004).
46. See Ahmet Sözen, The Cyprus Question in Turkey—EU Relations, in
THE POLITICS OF EU ACCESSION: TURKISH CHALLENGES AND CENTRAL
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES 72–89,78–81 (Lucie Tunkrová & Pavel Ŝaradín eds.,
2010).
47. S.C. Res. 1847 (Dec. 12, 2008).
48. Id.
49. What Happened in Cyprus, ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/03/interview-athanasiosorphanides. See also CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33497,
CYPRUS: STATUS OF U.N. NEGOTIATIONS AND RELATED ISSUES 10 (July 20,
2007), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdf (listing “doubt about the
economic viability of the Plan and the concern about its harm to the Greek
Cypriot standard of living” as a reason for rejecting the Plan).
50. MIGDALOVITZ, supra note 49, at 1.
51. Helena Smith, Cyprus Reunification Talks to Resume, Says UN
Secretary-General, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2017, 8:32 EDT), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/cyprus-reunification-talks-to-resume-says-unchief-security-power-sharing-divided-island.
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negotiations (May 17–26, 2017).52 In 2017, Secretary-General
Guterres announced he would host a joint meeting in June 2017,
between the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci, the Greek
Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and Mr. Eide.53 Progress
towards formal talks remains in “stop-start” mode.54 These
recent efforts have given renewed optimism for an agreed
settlement, but no tangible outcome has been reached.55
During these multiple mediation attempts, no female
negotiator has been appointed to the Cyprus conflict.56 In
underscoring the exclusion of women from the negotiation
process, I caution on an essential proposition that more women
in the negotiation process would necessarily mean better peace
or a gender-friendly peace settlement. Women hold a variety of
views on war and peace, and this is no less true of Cyprus than
it is of any other conflict.57 Nonetheless, rigid constructions
defining the narrative of the causes and fixes of the conflict
dominate the portrayal of gender and the Cyprus conflict.
Women are stereotypically portrayed as mothers, and helpless
victims of the war, affirming masculine virtues of security and
52. Statement by the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus,
Mr. Espen Barth Eide, UN CYPRUS TALKS (May 26, 2017),
http://www.uncyprustalks.org/statement-by-the-special-adviser-of-thesecretary-general-on-cyprus-mr-espen-barth-eide-2/.
53. UN Chief Announces New Talks on Cyprus Reunification in June,
DAILY MAIL (June 4, 2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article4572002/UN-chief-hosts-peace-talks-rival-Cypriot-leaders.html.
54. Tony Barber, Europe’s Coming War over Cyprus, INDEPENDENT, Jan.
23, 1997, at 16.
55. Smith, supra note 51.
56. PEACE RESEARCH INST. OSLO (PRIO) CYPRUS CENTRE, WOMEN’S PEACE
IN CYPRUS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENDER ADVISORY TEAM (GAT) ON
IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1325 PROVISIONS ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 8
(2012),
https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=442&type=publi
cationfile [hereinafter PRIO]. See generally Christine Bell & Catherine
O’Rourke, Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution
1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 941, 948
n.26 (2010) (finding that 99% of mediators who negotiate in peace processes are
male).
57. A 2012 study by the Interpeace Initiative, Cyprus 2015, and the Centre
for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) found significant
gender discrepancies over the political impact of a settlement. Specifically,
among Turkish Cypriot women, as opposed to Turkish Cypriot men, there were
significantly higher concerns that a settlement could lead to economic failure.
Among Greek Cypriot women, there were significantly higher concerns that
further negotiation could lead to renewed conflict. In this survey, women were
found to be less open to reconciliation than men. See Gender Participation in
the Peace Talks, INTERPEACE 6 (Nov. 22, 2012), http://www.interpeace.org/
resource/gender-participation-in-the-peace-talks/.
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militarism to protect them, translating into peace agreement
positions that are highly protectionist towards women but do not
take a transformative approach to the necessity of protecting
women’s rights in a post-conflict Cyprus.58
A. GENDER DIMENSIONS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN CYPRUS
Cyprus remains a highly traditional hetero-patriarchal
society. Despite its membership of the European Union, it faces
broad challenges in achieving gender equality and in meeting
European notions of political equality.59 Cyprus ranks among
the three lowest countries in the European Union for the
representation of women in politics; only 10.7 percent of all
political offices are held by women.60 Society remains culturally
conservative, with expectations of marriage and motherhood
dominant in social expectations for women’s lives.61
Women’s experience of the conflict and occupation of Cyprus
has been largely absent from conflict narratives. In turn, women
have struggled to have the gender dimensions of the conflict,
occupation, and peace process reflect their experiences and civil
society roles. Even following the passage of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1325 in 2001, which mandated the greater

58. FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN ET AL., ON THE FRONTLINE: GENDER, WAR, AND
POST-CONFLICT PROCESS 49–55 (2011); see also Laura Sjoberg, Gendered
Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis Needs Feminism,
50(4) INT’L STUD. Q. 889, 897 (2006): Women and War, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS 2–3 (June 19, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0944-womenand-war. In the context of Cyprus, Olga Demetriou notes:
In Cyprus, women are not depicted as agents in the war effort, neither
for the Turkish-Cypriots in the 1960s, nor for Greek-Cypriots in 1974.
The acknowledgment of their involvement, rare as it is, extends
normally to feeding and sheltering: in commemorative TV programs,
mention is made of Greek-Cypriot women who hid soldiers at home,
fed them, or helped them escape into safe territory as the Turkish
army was advancing.
OLGA DEMETRIOU, REFUGEEHOOD AND THE POST-CONFLICT SUBJECT:
RECONSIDERING MINOR LOSSES, (forthcoming 2018) (Chapter 7: Unhomly
Subjects) (on file with author).
59. See Kathambi Kinoti, The State of Women’s Rights in Cyprus,
EUROPEAN WOMEN’S LOBBY (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.womenlobby.org/TheState-of-Women-s-Rights-in-Cyprus.
60. Susana Pavlou, The Gender Gap in Women’s Leadership in Cyprus,
MEDITERRANEAN INST. GENDER STUD. 3 (Mar. 16, 2015), http://thehubcy
.org/media/files/Women’s%20Leadership%20and%20Participation%20in%20D
ecision-making(1).pdf.
61. Id. at 14.
THE
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inclusion of women in peace-processes and peace negotiations,62
the gendered dimensions of the conflict and occupation have
struggled to gain any traction in the negotiation process.63
Cyprus represents a valuable case study of the rhetorical tension
in conflict management between claims of urgency, security and
conflict resolution, given that Cyprus’ conflict has always been
“presented as ‘urgent’ and everything else ‘secondary’, and
because, despite the persistence over three generations now, ‘the
Cyprus problem’ is likely to be outlived by the problem of gender
inequality.”64 Women’s peace activism in Cyprus has a long and
distinguished history.65 For example, in 2002 and 2003, as peace
negotiations stalled, a bicommunal women’s non-governmental
organization (NGO) staged peaceful protests in the northern and
southern parts of Nicosia (crossing the Green line was forbidden
at that time), demanding a negotiated settlement and an end to
militarism.66 Consistent with many other conflicts and
occupation contexts, women remained formally side-lined in
negotiations, until 2012 when the U.N.’s Good Offices mission in
Cyprus supported the incorporation of gender concerns in the
peace negotiations.67 The establishment of a Gender Advisory
Team (GAT) in 2009 enabled a channel of communication to the
negotiation process that enabled a feminist and gender
perspective on issues as diverse as governance, citizenship, and
property.68 It constitutes a loose network of women, Greek62. See generally NI AOLAIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 107–08
(acknowledging that although the resolution was influential, it did not affect
actual practices).
63. See id., at 207–210.
64. PRIO, supra note 56, at 16 (building on a broader commitment to
ensuring the participation of civil society in the conflict resolution process in
Cyprus). See S.C. Res. 1818, Preamble (June 13, 2008).
65. See Myria Vassiliadou, Questioning Nationalism: The Patriarchal and
National Struggles of Cypriot Women Within a European Context, 9(4) EURO. J.
WOMEN’S STUD. 459, 460 (2002).
66. PRIO, supra note 56, at 2.
67. Id. at 5–6. See also S.C. Res. 2106 (June 24, 2013).
68. PRIO, supra note 56, at 5. GAT is made up of civil society activists,
academics and policy makers. GAT’s recommendations include provisions for
strong, constitutionally entrenched equal rights and non-discrimination
language in the Constitution of a United Federal Cyprus; health and social
security for all women including homemakers; securing sexual and reproductive
rights; equal gender representation in all levels of government as enabled by
temporary special measures; gender balanced public decision-making bodies,
including courts; the creation of special mechanisms to ensure gender equality
across federal entities; and a demand for equal rights for men to acquire,
change, or retain their citizenship (presently not the case under the 1960
Cyprus Constitution which holds that ‘the wide belongs to the community of the
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Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who have a variety of
backgrounds including political advocacy, NGO work and
academics. This channel comes in a context where no Cypriot
women have sat at the negotiation table, and few women have
significant leadership roles in institutions or structures that feed
into the negotiation process.69 While the GAT represents an
advance on the hitherto exclusion of women from the negotiation
process, the composition of the group is privileged, and the GAT
has struggled to incorporate the grassroots.70 Conversely, the
Gender Equality Technical Committee, attached to the
negotiations and providing input to negotiators as an official
committee constrained by all the formal rules of the negotiation
process and bi-communal engagement, means that in reality it
has been given an enormous mandate with no meaningful
authority.71 All members of the Committee undertake their work
in a voluntary capacity and are checked in their ability to ‘do’
conflict-related work, as Committee members require collective
approval to engage in activities.72 GAT members have reflected
on whether the gender “capture” of the Committee reflects a
tension of engagement “inside” rather than “outside” peace
processes, and tension between process and substantive
outcomes when women engage in formal peace making at the
expense of their external advocacy.73
husband.’). See Olga Demetriou & Maria Hadipaviou, The Impact of Women’s
Activism on the Peace Negotiation in Cyprus (Working Paper, 2017) (on file with
author).
69. PRIO, supra note 56, at 8. It should also be noted that the post 2004
position that all negotiations be Cypriot led has significant gender implications.
In practice, it means that the agreement will not be gender proofed by mediators
with international expertise, advice can be given to the key (male) negotiators
but there is no obligation to take account of any gender considerations in a Final
Status agreement.
70. Interview with Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeoris, Professor, Soc. and
Political Sci. Dep’t at the Univ. of Cyprus, in Nicosia, Cyprus (Sept. 29, 2016).
See also Maria Hadjipavlou, No Permission to Cross: Cypriot Women’s Dialogue
Across the Divide, 13(4) Gender, Place & Culture 329, 347 (2006).
71. See Statement by the Technical Committee on Gender Equality on the
Occasion of International Women’s Day 2016, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
FORCE
IN
CYPRUS,
https://unficyp.unmissions.org/statement-technicalcommittee-gender-equality-occasion-international-womens-day-2016
(last
visited Dec. 24, 2017); Gender Equality, UN Cyprus Talks, http://www.uncyprus
talks.org/gender-activities/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2017).
72. There is currently no published protocol on the Committee’s work, but
members explained that the modalities of engagement are informally agreed
and reported that they are working voluntarily. Interview with two serving
Committee members, in Cyprus (Sept. 29, 2016).
73. Interview with Olga Demetriou, Senior Research Consultant, Peace

2018]

GENDERING LAW OF OCCUPATION

121

The engagement of women in conflict process and
occupation regulation has been stymied by a number of
intersecting factors including 1) a historical context which has
not taken account of the specificity of women’s experiences
(occupation, colonialism and ethnic nationalism)74 2) structural
challenges including embedded patriarchy and hierarchical
gender roles75 3) a highly masculine political culture, the deep
public/private division in Cypriot life and the traction of gender
stereotypes76 and 4) the internalization by women of their
secondary and supportive roles, and social and personal barriers
to public political engagement.77 Despite a strong emphasis in
the Cypriot peace negotiations on ‘equality’ and ‘human rights,78
meaning specifically ethnic and political identity-based equality
and a narrowly defined set of civil and political rights, there has
been a complete evacuation of gender equality and gendered
human rights from the conception and implementation of
substantive equality that has been dominant in the peace talks
to date.79 The Cypriot political settlement in progress is
generally unmoored from gender concerns and remains a vehicle
for sustained patriarchal dialogue even as the language of
human rights and transformation litter the landscape.80
A defining element of the conflict and occupation in Cyprus
has been the ways in which definition of discrimination and
equality frame the negotiations towards a final settlement, and
have in part defined the nature of the highly militarised
occupation. An emphasis on identity is to be expected, given the
modern history of exclusions which are ethnically determined on
Research Inst. Oslo (PRIO), in Nicosia, Cyprus (Sept. 29, 2016).
74. See generally CYNTHIA COCKBURN, THE SPACE BETWEEN US:
NEGOTIATING GENDER AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT 40–45 (1998)
(exploring the relationship between nationalism and feminism); NIRA YUVALDAVIS, GENDER AND NATION 119–20 (1977) (discussing feminism through a lens
of identity politics and multi-culturalism).
75. See Lori Handrahan, Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction, 35(4) SEC. DIALOGUE 429, 431 (2004).
76. MARIA HADJIPAVLOU, WOMEN AND CHANGE IN CYPRUS: FEMINISMS AND
GENDER IN CONFLICT 19–26 (2010). See generally Judy El-Bushra,
Transforming Conflict: Some Thoughts on a Gendered Understanding of
Conflict Process, in STATE OF CONFLICT: GENDER, VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE
66–86, 80–82 (Susie Jacobs et al. eds., 2000) (exploring the range of identities
both within and between genders).
77. PRIO, supra note 56, at 5.
78. UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan of the Cyprus Question, supra
note 42, at arts. 2(1)(a), 2(1)(c), 4(1), 11(1), attachment 5.
79. PRIO, supra note 56, at 8.
80. See Maria Hadjipavlou, supra note 70, at 347.
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the Island (specifically minority groups, and the effacement of
hybrid identities). But the emphasis on identity as a result of
conflict and occupation has excluded gender identity in distinct
ways. First, identity is presumed to distribute along ethnic lines,
entirely side-lining gender identity, or the intersection of gender
identity with ethnic identity.81 Second, commentators have
identified the dominance of “ideal” citizen; “this ideal citizen, in
Cyprus, is male, belongs to a majority ethnicity (Greek-Cypriot /
Turkish-Cypriot), and is the protector of the nation – thus, ablebodied, masculine, heterosexual, and combat-ready.”82 In
parallel, women are perceived as weaker, in need of protection,83
vulnerable to the enemy and reproducers of two nations in
military opposition.84 One outworking of these gender ideologies
has been the privileging of the army, and the ways in which a
long-standing occupation has framed the military as the central
institution of the Cypriot state and territory under Turkish
occupation on the Island.85 Given the masculinity of the military,
its exclusion of women and the close connection between political
power and military service, women’s non-status in the military
has broader effects on their status and power in the civic and
political affairs of the Island.86

81. See Stacey Burlet & Helen Reid, A Gendered Uprising: Political
Representation and Minority Ethnic Communities, 21(2) ETHNIC & RACIAL
STUD. 270, 271 (1998); V. Spike Peterson, The Politics of Identity and Gendered
Nationalism, in FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ITS
SECOND GENERATION 167, 180 (Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey & Patrick J.
Haney eds., 1995) (Explaining a possible intersection of gender and ethnic
identity by discussing how women are used to police the border of ethnic
identity).
82. PRIO, supra note 56, at 24.
83. Id.
84. See Floya Anthias, Women and Nationalism in Cyrpus, in WOMEN—
NATION—STATE 150, 155–60 (Nira Yuval-Davis et al. eds., 1989) (showing how
women are perceived as reproducers who can reproduce for either side).
85. See PRIO, supra note 56, at 24 (showing that the privileged army is a
“ideal citizen”).
86. See, e.g., Anthias, supra note 84, at 159–64 (discussing how women’s
link to the family has affected their participation in the liberation struggle). See
generally Stratis-Andreas Efthymiou, Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity
in Post-2003 Cyprus 54, 229, 290 (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University
of Sussex).
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GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE DURING THE
INVASION AND OCCUPATION

While the Cyprus conflict has broadly faded from public
view, displaced by post-Cold War territorial disputes, genocides
and asymmetrical conflicts in which a deadly mix of sectarian
violence, terrorism, inter-state hostilities and low-high
thresholds of violence are experienced, in its time the conflict
was intense and riveting.87 While recent wars have brought
significant attention to the experience of women as victims of
conflict, Cyprus provided early motifs for much of the
preoccupations that make women visible in contemporary
wars.88 Significant evidence emerged early on that women were
targeted for sexual and gender-based violence in the hostilities
following Turkish military invasion of the Island.89 The early
territorial gains by the Turkish army as it invaded Cyprus set
the stage for significant and reported sexual violence against
women.90 As reported by Roussou:

87. See Miltos Miltiadou, Letter to the Editor, Cyprus Continues to Be
Victimized by Turkey, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Aug. 12, 1994, at 23A
(explaining how Turkey continues to occupy Cyprus with impunity).
88. See generally Doris E. Buss, Rethinking ‘Rape as a Weapon of War,’ 17
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 145 (2009) (discussing the recent interest in finding
rape as a weapon of war among feminists); Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender:
Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5(2) HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 243 (1994) (explaining how the interest in rape as a weapon of
war has only recently begun receiving international attention).
89. See Anna M Agathangelou, Nationalist Narratives and (Dis)Appearing
Women: State-Sanctioned Sexual Violence, 19(4) CANADIAN WOMEN STUD. 12,
12–14 (2000) [hereinafter Agathangelou]; Anna M. Agathangelou & Kyle D.
Killian, The Discourse of Refugee Trauma: Epistemologies of the Displaced, the
State, and Mental Health Practitioners, 21(1) CYPRUS REV. 19, 43 (2009)
[hereinafter Killian]; Olga Demetriou, The Militarization of Opulence:
Engendering a Conflict Heritage Site, 14(1) INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 56, 63–64
(2012); Villagers Driven from Cyprus Homes Charge Murder and Rape by Turks,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1974, at 70; Alexander Cockburn, How About Turkey’s
‘Aggression’ Against Cyprus?: Viewpoint, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1982, at 27;
Joseph Fitchett, Pressure Builds for Council of Europe to Condemn Turkish Acts
on Cyprus, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1977, at B4; Girl Tells of Rapes, Killings on
Cyprus, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1974, at 33; Miltiadou, supra note 87; Gene
Rossides, What About Turkey’s War Criminals?, HELLENIC TIMES (N.Y.C.), July
25, 2008, at 4.
90. See Maria Roussou, War in Cyprus: Patriarchy and the Penelope Myth,
in WOMEN & POLITICAL CONFLICT: PORTRAITS OF STRUGGLE IN TIMES OF CRISIS
25, 25–26 (Rosemary Ridd & Helen Callaway eds., 1987) (recounting the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the immediate aftermath).
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In the summer of 1974, the Turkish army invaded
Cyprus . . . Greek Cypriots living in this northern section
fled for their lives—on foot, in cars, in tractors, or by
whatever means of transport they could find. Over
200,000 became refugees. The 20,000 left behind—
mainly women, children and the elderly—found
themselves “enclaved” (the official term used by the
Greek Cypriot government to describe those Greek
Cypriots who remained or were forced to remain in the
Turkish-controlled area) at the mercy of the Turkish
soldiers.91

Evidence of sexual violence against Greek Cypriot women
was contained in the legal arguments advanced in the interstate
Cyprus v. Turkey case, which addressed a range of European
Convention violations instigated by the invasion and its
aftermath.92
On 21 March 1975, the applicant Government submitted
this application to the Commission in the following terms:
. . . 3. In the said Turkish occupied areas the following
atrocities and crimes were committed by way of
systematic conduct by Turkey’s state organs in flagrant
violation of the obligations of Turkey under the European
Convention on Human Rights during the period from 19
September 1974 until the filing of the present
Application:
. . . (b) Wholesale and repeated rapes. Even women of
ages up to 80 were savagely raped by members of the
Turkish forces. In some areas forced prostitution of
Greek Cypriot girls continues to be practiced. Many
women who remained in the Turkish occupied areas
became pregnant as a result of the rapes committed by
the Turkish troops.93
In the course of its submissions, the Cypriot government
complained of “wholesale and repeated rapes of women of all
ages from twelve to seventy-one, sometimes to such an extent
91. Id.
92. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 6780/74 & 6950/75, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 1, 10–14 (1976).
93. Id. at 11.
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that the victims suffered hemorrhages [sic] or became mental
wrecks.”94 The government also claimed that in areas under
Turkish occupation enforced prostitution was practiced,
systematic rape (multiple rape of the same victim by multiple
perpetrators), public rape (including women experiencing rape
in front of their children and family members), aggravated rape
(sexual violence accompanied by severe violence including but
not limited to head trauma and near suffocation), and
rape/murder nexus (where women were immediately killed
following their sexual violation) were common.95 Those targeted
included pregnant women and women who were mentally
retarded.96 The government pleadings also included claims that
women who were victims of rape by Turkish soldiers noted
several recorded cases of abortion at the British base.97 In total,
the European Commission addressed “written statements of 41
alleged victims of rape . . . of four alleged eye-witnesses of
rape . . . and of 24 hearsay witnesses of rape . . . .”98 In its formal
findings, the Commission held that the rapes were committed by
soldiers, including Turkish officers, and that the rapes were not
“isolated cases of indiscipline.”99 The Commission held that the
Turkish authorities did not take any action to prevent sexual
violence, nor punish its occurrence, and considered the nonprevention imputable to Turkey under the Convention.100 The
Commission concluded that the incidents of rape established in
the factual findings constituted “inhuman treatment” under
Article 3 of the Convention.101
Secondary sources affirm and provide greater detail on the
experiences of women including harrowing detail on the efforts
made by women to avoid sexual assault:
One woman related her experience: I saw him (the
Turkish soldier) still over me and I noticed others
showing that they approved of what he had done to
me . . . . Then he took my watch and engagement ring.
94. Id. at 120.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 122.
98. Id. at 123; see also Roussou, supra note 90, at 33 (detailing the
testimony of rape victims and eye-witnesses to rape).
99. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 6780/74 & 6980/75, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 1, 124 (1976).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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Immediately afterwards another threw me to the ground
and started to undress me, with the same intention as
the first . . . I staggered in the direction of the other
women, and caught up with them. I saw a two year old
[sic] boy and took him in my arms, even though I was
losing my strength, hoping this would save my life. While
I was holding the little boy, some Turks surrounded us
again, and one of them started pulling me . . . . As we
were walking towards Six Mile Beach, we found some
charcoal and I used it to make my face black, to look old,
hoping to avoid being raped again.102

A few notable features of the account of extensive rape in
Cyprus bear closer examination. First, there are no
comprehensive statistics available on the total number of
victims.103 Despite widespread knowledge of these harms,
quantification has remained elusive.104 Second, the lack of
confirmed data connects to the challenges in tracing women who
scattered during the invasion and remained in various parts of
the south of the island thereafter.105 The lack of exposure is
compounded by the accounts that note that “[t]hose Cypriot
women who survived these dreadful experiences, particularly
those who did not become pregnant, hid their ‘painful secret’
deep within themselves and tried to start a new life.”106 Notably,
while sexual violence threaded through the accounts of the
conflict in important and legally significant ways at the time of
the invasion, it was erased in memory and political discussions
soon thereafter.107 More recent attempts to address the needs of
rape victims have demonstrated both erasure of narratives and
the inter-ethnic blame game being deployed to shut down public
dialogue. Olga Demetriou demonstrates that conversations
about rape devolve into either charged defences of militaries and
the reverse charge of ethnic slurring, or impassioned pleas for
102. Roussou, supra note 90, at 33.
103. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh
Periodic Reports of Cyprus, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/6–7 (2013)
(expressing concerns about inadequate statistical data).
104. Id. See also Agathangelou, supra note 89, at 13–14.
105. Agathangelou, supra note 89, at 13–14; Killian, supra note 89, at 11–
12.
106. Roussou, supra note 90, at 34.
107. See INTERPEACE, supra note 57, at 2–3 (explaining how women are
excluded from the peace talks in Cyprus).
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better social support to rape victims by the states.108 As the
account of the nascent peace process details above, women are
barely visible in the negotiations, and sexual violence and its
long-term consequences for victims and communities are
scarcely mentioned as part of the accounting that would be
necessary in a new political dispensation.109 Moreover, despite
providing early legal recognition of sexual violence in conflict as
a human rights violation, the Cyprus experience provided little
lasting impact upon international legal norms related to conflictrelated sexual violence.110 Rather, that heavy lifting was done by
another European conflict decades later, as the collapse of the
Former Yugoslavia gave rise to systematic and sustained sexual
violence.111 Moreover, the attention to sexual violence during the
invasion and any link to ongoing issues of sexual exploitation on
the island, particularly in respect of human trafficking (detailed
below), has been largely ignored.112 It should be noted that we
108. Demetriou states “And yet, when questions about the rehabilitation of
actual victims of war rapes were raised by feminist parliamentarians on both
sides, alongside acknowledgements of the existence of Other victims, public
opinion was scandalized. The Turkish-Cypriot parliamentarian Doğuş Derya
who swore on her own oath in 2013, brought up the issue in 2014 and was
castigated by colleagues and in social media for suggesting, ‘treasonously’, that
Turkish soldiers raped. Having brought the threats she received to court, she
was asked, as she took the stand, to explain ‘who raped who in 1974’: ‘men raped
women’, she replied.” DEMETRIOU, supra note 58.
109. See id. at 3–4 (explaining how not including women in the process has
long term consequences); Killian, supra note 89, at 41–45 (showing how
narratives of sexual violence can be used to support patriarchy).
110. See Miltiadou, supra note 87 (showing that Cyprus has not engaged in
the international legal process).
111. See WOMENAID INT’L, WARBURTON MISSION II REPORT: EC
INVESTIGATIVE MISSION INTO THE TREATMENT OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ¶¶ 14–20 (Feb. 1993), http://www.womenaid.org/
press/info/humanrights/warburtonfull.htm#Findings (concluding the rape of
Muslim women was part of a “systematic” pattern of abuse); Kirsten Campbell,
The Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual Violence and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 411,
413 (2007) (discussing the ICTY jurisprudence that shaped sexual violence
crimes as prohibited by international humanitarian law); Rana Jaleel, Weapons
of Sex, Weapons of War: Feminism, Ethnic Conflict and the Rise of Rape and
Sexual Violence in Public International Law During the 1990s, 27(1) CULTURAL
STUD. 115, 120–21 (2013) (discussing the enshrinement of “violence against
women” within the international human rights framework); Mary Valentich,
Rape Revisited: Sexual Violence Against Women in the Former Yugoslavia, 3(1)
CANADIAN J. HUM. SEXUALITY 53, 53–56 (1994) (providing an overview of the
sexual violence endured by the estimated 20,000 to 50,000 women raped in
Yugoslavia).
112. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Cyprus: Trafficking in Persons Report (2016),
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258754.htm
(designating
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have no reliable statistics of levels of sexual and intimate
partner violence in the TRNC, and limited means to gauge the
effectiveness of legal remedies for crimes of sexual violence in
the jurisdiction. This means that despite the links now being
demonstrated in other jurisdictions about the relationship
between pre and post-conflict violence for women,113 the capacity
to undertake that assessment in Cyprus is very limited.
IV.

FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE UNDER
OCCUPATION

Challenges of marriage, divorce, and inheritance in the
context of the occupation are real and under-appreciated. In the
broader literature on the law of occupation, they scarcely merit
consideration.114 The Cypriot occupation thus offers insight into
the complexity of these issues for women’s lived lives under
occupation, which have relevance to multiple global sites of
occupation. I suggest that these gendered aspects of day-to-day
life are excluded from the law of occupation for three overlapping
reasons. First, the law of occupation has broadly omitted issues
of family, private life and sexual harm from its regulatory scope.
The explanations for such absences are explained in part by the
patriarchal and masculine sensibilities of these legal norms
shaped by a broader historic absence of gender concerns from the
law of armed conflict. Second, the law of occupation expressly
functions in a frame of legal pluralism,115 whereby occupation
law affirms the ongoing application of ‘local’ civil law to matters
of intimate and family life ceding the private (in principle) to the
prevailing legal order when territory is captured and occupied.
Cyprus as a Tier 1 anti-trafficking country that fully complies with standards).
113. See Romi Sigsworth & Nahla Valji, Violence Against Women and the
Limitations of Transitional Justice, in GENDER IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 115–
35, 115–19 (Susanne Buckley-Zistel & Ruth Stanley eds., 2012); see also
Rashida Manjoo & Calleigh McRaith, Gender-Based Violence and Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Areas, 44 CORNELL L. J. 11 (2011) (asserting women
are targeted for gender-based violence during conflicts and remain vulnerable
to violence post-conflict).
114. See, e.g., Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupational:
Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580 (2006)
(omitting any discussion of divorce, marriage, or human rights).
115. See generally Holly Dunn, The Transitional Justice Gap: Exploring
‘Everyday’ Gendered Harms and Customary Justice in South Kivu, DR Congo,
FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES, 1 (2016) (linking transitional justice measures with
the co-existence of other legal systems, showing how women in particular move
between the systems).
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As will be addressed further below, this separation is often
meaningless in practice as the legal fact of occupation invariably
tests and limits the capacity of the prevailing legal order to
function effectively or develop progressively. Finally, in
transformative long-term occupations the legal gaps occasioned
by the duration of the occupation can be theoretically remedied
by the application of international human rights law.116 Here the
progressive dimensions of human rights norms and
jurisprudence could be used to ameliorate the limitations
occasioned by the conservation principle contained in the law of
armed conflict.117 However, states have positively resisted this
move, notably the state of Israel’s undulating position that
human rights norms do not apply in the Occupied Palestinian
despite
consistent
international
legal
Territories,118
jurisprudence which affirms otherwise.119
All of these intersecting aspects contribute to the absence of
a regulatory content for ‘private’ regulation in the law of armed
conflict. In each occupation setting, other variables can
contribute to the marginalization of gender and the underregulation of women’s lives. In Cyprus, the conflict intersection
of ‘private’ matters has been elevated by the emphasis on
property rights in the political negotiations to end the Cyprus

116. See e.g. Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in the
Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol (Ukraine), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (Sept. 25, 2017). The Human
Rights Council tied the idea of family unity during occupation to the “right to
family life” embedded within international instruments. Id.
117. See e.g. Kristin Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: Contours of Jus
Post Bellum Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review
(2009). [Boon argues that a core aspect of the law of armed conflict is it
conservatism. Boon argues that this principle is regressing particularly in the
context of international administrations overlap with occupation law. This
article argues that gender norms in occupation buck this trend and remain
highly static.
118. Note recent position of Israel in its reporting to the CEDAW Committee:
“It is Israel’s position that the CEDAW is not applicable beyond a State’s
national territory,” and thus not applicable in the “Occupied Palestinian
Territory.” Israel Report: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under
Article 18 of the Convention Pursuant to the Simplified Reporting Procedure, ¶¶
8–13, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ISR/6 (July 14, 2017).
119. This view is affirmed in the position of the ICJ on the parallel
application of Human Rights and Law of Armed conflict in situations of
occupation. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (Palestinian Wall Case), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep.
2004 (July 9).
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conflict and the occupation.120 To state the obvious, if there are
issues of title concerning a disputed property that is subject to
testy political negotiation then the significance of marital
breakdown has a visibility in the conflict settings that it would
otherwise lack, notwithstanding that the fact that conflict may
significantly order the ways in which relationships are ended,
and in which rights (including property rights) are enforced, or
not.121 Anecdotally, in contrast with the occupation in
Israel/Palestine, marriage across the divide is occurring (though
infrequently),122 and there are no formal barriers to marriage
and/or to living with one’s spouse post marriage on either side of
the territorial divide.123 However, the reality of a formal border,
passport checks and the complexity of managing legal
relationships across these boundaries clearly affects the choice
to marry and the ‘ease’ of private relationships and private
ordering under occupation. The lack of common legal system
across Cyprus and Occupied Territory is a formidable barrier to
the resolution of family and women’s rights issues and enables a
range of gendered abuses. In both parts of the Island, marriage
is highly valued and deeply embedded in cultural-religious

120. See Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of
Good Offices in Cyprus ¶ 6 U.N. Doc. S/2016/15 (Jan. 7, 2016); Agathangelou,
supra note 89, at 15.
121. See generally Proukaki, supra note 30 (showing how diaspora has
affected property rights); Williams, supra note 30 (explaining how property
rights have been affected by international involvement in Cyprus as a result of
occupation).
122. See Judy Maltz, Why Interfaith Marriage Is on the Rise in Israel—and
Why It’s a Problem, HAARETZ (June 2, 2014, 10:19PM), https://www.haaretz.
com/jewish/shavuot/.premium-1.596678 (estimating 5-10% of all Israeli couples
are in interfaith marriages and of the estimated almost 9,000 couples married
overseas, Jewish-Arab couples made up only 0.03%); Raf Sanchez, What Is It
Like to Be Married to an Arab in Israel?, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 11, 2016, 12:00PM
GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/120904
39/What-is-it-like-to-be-a-Jew-married-to-an-Arab-in-Israel.html (estimating
there are only a few hundred Jewish-Arab married couples in Israel).
123. See Jan Asmussen, Intermarriages and Interethnic Love Stories in
Cyprus, HALKBILIMI (Jan. 2010), http://www.academia.edu/30910399/
Intermarriages_and_interethnic_love_stories_in_Cyprus
(explaining
the
historical status of interfaith marriages in Cyprus). Compare Areti
Dimosphenus, Marriages Between Christians and Muslims on Cyprus: Rights
and Obligations of Women in a Muslim Family, ORTHOCHRISTIAN.COM (last
visited Oct. 25, 2017), http://orthochristian.com/97969.html (discussing how
1950s legislation concerning interfaith marriages has effected Christian women
in Cyprus), with HCJ 466.07 MK Zahava Gal-On v. Attorney General 65(2) PD
44 (2007) (Isr.) (preventing spouses in Israel from living within the Green Line
if they are from Gaza).
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identity.124 Hence, ramifications of the breakdown take on a
visibility and significance that might not otherwise be the case
in a non-conflict site. Moreover, functional relationships, despite
the occupation, speak to the capacity of overcoming the religious
and ethnic difference in the most intimate sites of life. Their
failure can be read as illustrating not just the end of a particular
marriage but rather a broader impossibility of a relationship
between communities. Here the personal is potentially highly
political.
In the context of marriage breakdown, one of the issues
strongly reported during my fieldwork was the practical issues
that arose when navigating the end of or difficulties within a
marital relationship across occupied and non-occupied territory.
The obvious first challenge—given the lack of a common legal
system—is that legal process to address dissolution, domestic
violence, rights of access to children, financial maintenance or
barring a spouse from home due to the threat or actuality of
violence must be processed concurrently in two legal systems.125
This invariably requires dual legal representation, as legal
representation in both systems are entirely separate, and
lawyers qualified to practice on Greek Cypriot territory are not
recognized in the Occupied Territory and visa-versa. Leaving
aside issues of duplication, the costs of paying lawyers in two
jurisdictions can be prohibitively expensive for the average
litigant, and women may suffer specific disadvantages in having
access to funds because they may not have title to common
marriage property, or may have difficulty accessing bank and
124. Note that Paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Republic’s Constitution reads:
(a) a married woman shall belong to the Community to which her
husband belongs.
(b) a male or female child under the age of twenty-one who is not
married shall belong to the Community to which his or her father
belongs, or, if the father is unknown and he or she has not been
adopted, to the Community to which his or her mother belongs.
Rep. Cyprus Const. art. 2, ¶ 7.
[This provision enables] . . . via the logic of patriliny, women as the
property of men, law has come to mediate ethnicity and family life.
Inter-ethnic marriages were effectively prohibited under the above
provisions. The moment they took place they were no longer interethnic: Article 2.7 rendered the wife a co-ethnic of her husband.
DEMETRIOU, supra note 58.
125. See Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Cyprus as A Mixed Legal System, J. CIV. L.
STUD. 38, 66–70 (2013); MARTHA HAYES SAMPSON, ASSER INSTITUUT,
ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY LAW JUDGMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: REPORT
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, T.M.C. 4–5 (2005), http://ec.europa.eu/
civiljustice/publications/docs/family_rights/cyprus_en.pdf.
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other accounts in one part of the Island if living in another.126 In
an interview with a prominent feminist lawyer, she described
the process of constantly “manoeuvring around the rules.”127
This lawyer describes her willingness to travel to the North to
be in the Courts where her clients were engaging the Northern
legal system in divorce or custody proceedings, as an “act of
solidarity;” her presence had a psychological effect on the court
as she served as a witness to the proceedings. However, the same
lawyers also reported “not feeling protected” in the North and
understood that there were psychological and practical
challenges for lawyers to engage in this kind of advocacy for their
clients across the occupation lines.128 Moreover, in contentious
divorce or domestic violence proceedings, a social worker will be
designated in each jurisdiction for any children, but welfare
officers in each part of the divided island do not have the
authority to visit the other part, so any assessment of family life
is only applicable in its own part of the Island.129 Where there
are conflicted assessments there exists no agreed mechanism to
resolve them, only the unpredictability of court proceedings. In
the best-case scenario, there will be informal information
sharing between legal officers; and in the worst-case scenario,
none at all.
One highly charged issue that has emerged in marriage
dissolution is the issue of child access. For example, issues arise
where parents live on different sides of the buffer/demilitarized
zone, or where one holds a foreign passport, or where a child lives
on one side of the demilitarized zone but attends school on the
other. Anecdotal reports indicate that there has been a practice
for alienated spouses (mostly men) to place their children on a
“stop list” with local authorities.130 This mechanism, which is a
procedure under the Hague Convention, is intended to be a
safety mechanism to prevent a child from exiting a jurisdiction

126. Interview with Cyprian personnel that the author wishes to keep
anonymous. Sources verified by the Journal. (Sept. 29,2016).
127. Interview with Cyprian lawyer that the author wishes to keep
anonymous. Sources verified by the Journal. (Sept. 29, 2016) [hereinafter
Cyprian Lawyer Interview].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See MPs Call for Action Over Abducted Children, CYPRUS MAIL ONLINE
(June 3, 2014), http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/06/03/mps-call-for-action-overabducted-children/; Travel Documents for Minors—Cyprus, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/travel/entry-exit/eu-citizen/cyprus/
index_en.htm.
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without the consent of a parent.131 The stop list only formally
applies to legal ports of entry. In the North, however, a father
does not have to go to Court to prevent travel of a child from the
North to the South; the father can simply give a notarized note
to the border crossing agents because the Northern Cypriot
authorities view the border as an ‘international’ border, and to
cross this border a child must be accompanied by a parent or
authorized adult, with the consent of both parents.132 This would
prevent a child from crossing to attend school, to live with her
mother (if her home was in the Greek Cypriot part of the Island)
or visit extended family. The individual (often the male spouse)
in the North thus has the effective power of the state, in a
context where the state itself is not recognized beyond its
borders. To lift the ban, a plaintiff must go to court, and
generally, this process takes about eighteen months, with all of
the attendant costs and challenges involved.133 Practically, a
court Bailiff in the Greek Cypriot part of the Island cannot
deliver or enforce legal orders in the North. E-mail may be the
only form of communication but is not effective for legal
enforcement.134 This particular issue underscores the lived
consequences of the occupation and division that accompanies it
for the regulation of family life, and the harsh consequences for
women when marriages end. The invisibility of these issues to
the legal regulation of sites of occupation is also striking, and the
relative disinterest of legal scholars in the nexus between
domestic civil law and the overlay of the occupation regimes
ignored.
Broadly defined, the family law provisions to be followed in
both parts of the Island are the same, and are drawn from
British colonial legislation135 and the binding precedent in
131. See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
132. Cyprian lawyer Interview, supra note 127.
133. See Maria Pilikou, The International Comparative Legal Guide to:
Litigation & Dispute Resolution 2011, GLOBAL LEGAL GROUP 75,
http://www.chrysostomides.com.cy/assets/modules/chr/publications/14/docs/cyp
rus_chapter.pdf (2011) (“Normally, civil proceedings take between 2-3 years,
depending on the Court’s workload and/or delaying tactics of the Defendant.”).
134. Civil Procedure Rules Order 2 (Cyprus) http://www.cypruslaw.narod.
ru/laws/CYPRUS_CIVIL_PROCEDURE_RULES.doc. See Christos Clerides,
Civil Law and Procedures, CYPRUS L. DIG. (Dec. 13, 2012) http://www.cyprus
lawdigest.com/topics/judicial-system/item/133-civil-law-and-procedures.
135. Until 1990, all the relevant “family law” provisions were enacted during
British sovereignty in Cyprus. See Eliana Nicolaou, Cyprus: Recent
Developments in Family Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW:
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British and Cypriot systems. Once a legal action has commenced
in divorce or family law proceedings, there is no formal system
of sharing information across the legal systems in place in the
occupied and non-occupied portions of the territory. In situations
of domestic violence, this informal sharing is at best insufficient,
and at worst can contribute to the legal isolation and physical
vulnerability of the battered woman. In the best cases, lawyers
will share information informally. Because divorce proceedings
and decrees and/or barring orders issued in the North are not
binding in the Greek Cypriot territory, legal actors are not
incentivized to cooperate. Conversely, if a domestic dispute or
divorce involves proceedings in the Greek Cypriot territory and
one party chooses not to attend, the Court has the authority to
proceed in his/her absence.136 Moreover, any orders issued
including the provisions of maintenance, safety or barring
orders, payment of fees, custodial arrangements as regards
children have no mechanism of enforcement across the
demilitarised zone, making the Court orders extremely difficult
to administer in practice.137 Thus, maintenance orders across
the divide do not specify the means to enforce them, resulting in
dysfunctional payment methods and this means that there is no
formal means to track payment or non-payment, further
weakening enforcement.138 To compound matters, one cannot
easily transfer monies from a bank account in the South to the
North, making the provision of maintenance across the divide
extremely fraught.139 For Judges in family law cases who are
1996 121, 121–34 (Andrew Bainham ed., 1998). The Turkish community
initially had their own provisions under the Turkish Family and Divorce Law
of 1951. Id. With the adoption of civil marriage in Greece, Cyprus underwent
modernization and streamlined “family law” in 1990. Id. at 125–26. Although
the Civil Marriage Law of 1990 initially defined “marriage” as between persons
who belong to the Greek community, it was amended in 2002 to include any
parties married under the law. O Peri Efarmogis tou peri Gamou Nomou, Kef.
279, se Meli tis Tourkikis Koinotitas [The Implementation of the Marriage Law,
Cap. 279, to Members of the Turkish Community], (Law 46(I)/2002) (Cyprus).
See Sampson, supra note 125, at 4–5.
136. See, e.g., Zenonos v. Zissaki, (2009) 1 A.A.D. 661, (Cyprus) (detailing a
case where the father contested the mother’s actions, and the mother never
appeared; The district court continued without her and ordered the mother to
return the children to Cyprus from Greece).
137. See D v. D [2016] EWHC 3546, [3]–[5] (Fam) (Eng.) (discussing child
support payments ordered in TRNC).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., TRNC Banks Will Monitor All Transfers from the South, LGC
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2013) http://www.lgcnews.com/trnc-banks-will-monitor-alltransfers-from-the-south/.
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aware of the dual proceedings, there is an informal practice of
asking legal counsel what stage the process may be at;
occasionally, judges may be willing to lock-step proceedings
across the divide. But such lock-stepping is highly dependent on
each judge’s individualized decision; judges are more likely to let
parallel proceedings in both jurisdictions, even if both
proceedings may move at the same pace and produce similar
findings/outcomes likely.140 Where this is not the case, the
individual plaintiff is at a significant disadvantage. Notably, any
decision from a Greek Cypriot court has legal validity outside
the Island and is internationally enforceable; decisions from the
Occupied Northern Territory do not have international legal
recognition.141 Interviews revealed how the nonrecognition of
legal orders in the occupied territory had been used to slow
down, or create further uncertainty in highly contentious divorce
and / or domestic violence proceedings.142
The fact of separate legal systems, a product of long-term
and sustained occupation, has deep consequences across all
facets of the legal system, including for family law practices. At
a human level, the best interest of the child in family matters is
clearly compromised.143 There is also increasing awareness that
marital disputes and family law arrangements, which are often
gender-stratified, compound gender-based dispossession for
women, leaving little or no access to the financial resources of
the marriage, including property.144 It is only relatively recently
140. Interview with Cyprian lawyer that the author wishes to keep
anonymous. Sources verified by the Journal. (Sept. 29, 2016) (revealing how the
lack of recognition for legal orders in the occupied territory had been used to
slow down, or create further uncertainty in highly contentious divorce and/or
domestic violence proceedings).
141. Anastasios A. Antoniou, Litigation and Enforcement in Cyprus:
Overview, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW (Sep. 1, 2015)
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/7-502-0202?transitionType=
Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.y.
142. Cyprian Lawyer Interview, supra note 127.
143. Id.
144. See generally Richard Hauser & Roland Berntsen, Wife of Frau, Women
Do Worse: A Comparison of Men and Women in the United States and Germany
After Marital Dissolution, 28(3) DEMOGRAPHY 353 (1991) (concluding that
family income for women undergoing divorce fell significantly more than family
income for men in both the United States and Germany); Karen C. Holden, The
Economic Costs of Marital Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate
Cost?, 17 ANNUAL REV. SOCIOLOGY 51, 51 (1991) (exploring why divorce and
widowhood have “negative and prolonged consequences for women’s economic
well-being”); Wilfred Uunk, The Economic Consequences of Divorce for Women
in the European Union: The Impact of Welfare State Arrangements, 20 EUR. J.
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that these issues have emerged in the Gender Equality
Technical Committee, and the Gender Advisory Team as both
assess how in a post-conflict Cyprus such challenges be
ameliorated taking account of the effects of the conflict. The
Committee and women’s organizations recognize that in the
context of challenges for women in divorce, family law, and
custodial rights, the issues are not merely dismissed as
individual patriarchal behavior; rather, individual behavior is
supported by the occupation and the impunity for male behavior
and control is enabled by the occupation.145
As illustrated above, challenges faced by women as a result
of the occupation and separation of Cyprus are numerous. For
Turkish Cypriot women, there are the burdens of living in a
territory which is not internationally recognized, being a
minority community on the Island of Cyprus and not having the
legal status of European Union citizens.146 For both Turkish and
Greek Cypriot women there are deep commonalities of gendered
exclusion, frozen patriarchies that accompany a frozen conflict,
and the insidious ways in which the application of the law of
armed conflict in a long-term transformative occupation means
that the day-to-day issues that dominate women’s lives are
either under-regulated or not regulated at all.147 Moreover, “the
contradictions and weaknesses of international humanitarian
law” enable the wholesale exclusion of many of the practices and
issues that most concern women’s lives from regulation.148

POPULATION 251 (2004) (discussing the economic consequences of divorce for
women and subsequent increased dependence on social welfare in the EU).
145. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on his
Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/2016/15 (Jan. 7, 2016)
(explaining the composition of the Committee).
146. Fatma Güven Lisaniler, Gender Equality in North Cyprus (Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus), 7 QUADERNS DE LA MEDITERRÀNIA [NOTEBOOKS
OF THE MEDITERRANEAN] 133, 136 http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/
quaderns/7/133_Guven.pdf (2006).
147. Office of the Law Comm’r, Cyprus: Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic
Report (1993-2003) on the Implementation of the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶¶ 9–10, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/3-5 (Feb. 16, 2004).
148. GERSHON SHAFIR, A HALF CENTURY OF OCCUPATION: ISRAEL,
PALESTINE, AND THE WORLD’S MOST INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 166 (2017).
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A. TRAFFICKING AND OCCUPATION
One highly insidious practice that has accompanied the
occupation in Northern Cyprus is the emergence and
consolidation of human trafficking as an established practice.
The Fourth Geneva Convention does not regulate human
trafficking in situations of occupation, nor was the existence of
trafficking a meaningful issue in the negotiations of the
Conventions or the Additional Protocols.149 However, as an
opaque legal space in which local law and international law are
in constant interaction and contestation, practices such as
trafficking often thrive precisely because there is a legal grey
zone that enables them to.150 The lack of legal recognition for the
status of the territory in Northern Cyprus creates a gap in
enforcement capacity for international organizations and
NGO’s.151 With the state in abeyance, legal enforcement slips.152
Moreover, Turkey continues to maintain a chimera of distance
from the day-to-day administration of justice in the TRNC and
its claims that the TRNC is an independent governance
structure, which has control and responsibility for the
enforcement of laws national and international further weakens
the rule of law, and the meaningful enforcement of human rights
and international norms.153 In this context, legal protection for
a range of rights, including the right to be free from slavery,
forced prostitution, sexual exploitation and gender-based
149. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
287; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
150. See Olivia Enos, Human Trafficking Thrives Where Rule of Law Ends,
HERITAGE FOUND. http://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/human-traffick
ing-thrives-where-rule-law-ends, (Mar. 17, 2015).
151. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 112.
152. Id.
153. See How Did the Situation Change After July 1974?, Republic of
Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/how-did-thesituation-change-after-july-1974-_.en.mfa (describing how the “Turkish Cypriot
people re-organized itself as a federated state . . . .”); Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Cyprus Issue, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: FOREIGN POLICY, http://www.mfa.
gov.tr/cyprus-issue-_summary_.en.mfa (“Cyprus is the home of two nations and
there exist two democratically organized states in the island.”).
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violence is constrained.154 These are also the kinds of conditions
in which human trafficking thrives.155
In 2013, the United States State Department placed Cyprus
on the tier two watch-list for human trafficking, making it the
only EU nation to be placed in this category.156 Since 2013, the
Republic of Cyprus has worked along with European institutions
to strengthen laws against human trafficking.157 Among the key
provisions of the law has been a new National Act Plan to
Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.158 This new National
Action Plan provides specific targets and measures to seek to
improve coordination, prevention, identification and recognition
of victims, protection and support of victims, suppression and
prosecution, data collection, training, international cooperation,
and evaluation.159 In addition, following directives by the EU
(2011/36/EU), Cyprus has established funds to assist victims of
human trafficking and has participated in the EU program,
“Towards a Pan European Monitoring System” that seeks to use
an online platform to monitor human trafficking.160 Because of
these efforts, the United States State Department has deemed
that Cyprus is meeting the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and is taking positive steps towards
eliminating human trafficking.161 Notably, all of the efforts have
been pursued in the Greek Cypriot part of the Island, which
continues to underscore the enforcement gap in the TRNC.162
Thus, the European Commission has stated that “the
occupied part of Cyprus, in which the Republic of Cyprus does
not exercise effective control, is increasingly a destination for
154. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 112.
155. Enos, supra note 150.
156. Nikolaj Nielsen, Cyprus Ranks with Afghanistan on Human
Trafficking, EU OBSERVER (June 21, 2012), https://euobserver.com/
justice/116698.
157. EU Network of National Rapporteurs, Together Against Human
Trafficking in Human Beings: Cyprus, EUR. COMM., https://ec.europa.eu/antitrafficking/content/nip/cyprus_en#4 (last updated June 11, 2017).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 112.
162. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 139–40 (2015)
(“The area administered by Turkish Cypriots continues to be a zone of impunity
for human trafficking . . . .Turkish Cypriot authorities do not fully meet the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and are not making
significant efforts to do so. The area administered by the Turkish Cypriots
lacked an anti-trafficking ‘law.’”).
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women from Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa who are
subjected to forced prostitution in nightclubs.”163 Within
Northern Cyprus, these nightclubs provide approximately $7
million to $10 million annually in tax revenue.164 Furthermore,
the State Department found that Turkish Cypriots do not have
any specific laws against human trafficking and that the
minimal laws in place against forced labor are not enforced and
that victims who spoke out against trafficking were deported.165
Northern Cyprus has yet to adopt any of the provisions
recommended by the EU or the laws that have been
implemented by the Republic of Cyprus and have been found to
have done nothing to address these issues.166 To meet their
obligations under the Council of Europe and the EU, it is likely
that Northern Cyprus will have to take necessary steps to
combat human trafficking, domestic violence, and other human
rights violations.
V. CONCLUSION
The Cyprus case provides some valuable insights into the
gendered dimensions of occupation, relevant for a broader
reassessment of the extent to which occupation law is “fit for
purpose” specifically as it regulates long-term transformative
occupations.167 A key element of the Cyprus occupation is that it
has been protracted and sustained.168 The law of occupation, in
its original conceptualization, was assumed to have a short-term
and utilitarian function, designed for the protection of land and
people until the disputed territory was returned to its rightful
sovereign.169 Long-term and belligerent territorial control of
occupied territory has meant expanded patterns of exclusions
and under-enforcement of law for women, and in particular,
illustrates the opaque under-regulation of the private sphere
under occupation, generally to the detriment of women’s
163. EU Network of National Rapporteurs, supra note 157.
164. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra 162.
See also Interview with Cyprian personnel that the author wishes to keep
anonymous. Sources verified by the Journal. (Oct. 29, 2016) (providing insight
into the practical dynamics of trafficking in the space).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Roberts, supra note 114, at 580 (2006).
168. Id. at 596.
169. See EYAL BENVENESTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2d
ed. 2012).
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protection and entitlements.170 Hence, fundamental questions as
to the adequacy of the law of occupation to address women’s
needs and rights are exposed.
In respect of the invasion and armed conflict that gave rise
to occupation, the evidence of widespread sexual violence
accentuates the relationship in many conflict sites between
territorial conquest and sexual violence against women.171 Much
less clear is the extent to which patterns of sexual violence in
conflict persist in long-term and transformative occupations.
The lack of data from the TRNC makes mapping those
connections difficult, compounded by the lack of formal
international recognition for the occupied territory limiting the
extent of external legal and political oversight. This underscores
a theme of this article, namely that the structure of the law of
occupation can serve to occlude and compound harms against
women rather than expose and open them up to scrutiny.
Occupation can function as a shield to scrutiny rather than a
sword of protection, notwithstanding its overt protective
function under the laws of war. This Article sheds light on
important aspects of family and personal life which are routinely
ignored in accounts of occupation, and generally viewed as
irrelevant to the protective function of this body of legal norms.
The significance of this is more obvious with long-term ‘frozen’
conflicts when every aspect of human life is to some degree
impinged upon by the occupation. It reveals further important
distinctions between public and private regulation in the laws of
war,172 whereby the private (here family life and intimate
violence) are excluded from the regulatory sphere. This leaves
these issues and the lives affected by them to the vicissitudes of
the occupying power, who may not always be benevolent, but can
reliably be assumed to be patriarchal. While the law of
occupation is seen as peripheral to the bulk of armed conflict
regulation, recall the number of recent and ongoing occupations
170. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Negative Impact of Military
Occupation on Women’s Rights Stressed in Third Committee, U.N. Press
Release GA/SHC/3417 (Oct. 21, 1997) (mentioning various negative impacts of
military occupation on women’s rights).
171. See Dara Kay Cohen, Explaining Rape during Civil War: CrossNational Evidence (1980–2009), 107(3) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 461 (2013); Elisabeth
Jean Wood, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Policy Implications of
Recent Research, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 457 (2014).
172. See, e.g., Valerie Oosterveldt, Feminist Debates on Civilian Women and
International Humanitarian Law, 27(2) WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 385,
385 (2009) (examining the sufficiency of the international humanitarian law
provisions to address the situation of civilian women caught in armed conflict).
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where lives are affected in similar ways including IsraelPalestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Western Sahara, and the
Crimea.173 Closer gendered analysis of the law of occupation is
long-overdue, as is timely reform of those aspects which are most
detrimental to women’s lives, and augmentation to make the law
relevant to the lives subject to its oversight in contemporary
conflicts.

173. See Hannah Rought-Brooks, Gaza: The Impact of Conflict on Women,
NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL (2015) https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/
reports/gaza---the-impact-of-conflict-on-women.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
BRIEFING PAPER: BACKGROUND ON WOMEN’S STATUS IN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE
FALL OF THE SADDAM HUSSEIN GOVERNMENT (2003); Erica Vasquez, Living
Under Occupation in the Western Sahara: Women, Resistance, and SelfDetermination, GEORGETOWN INST. FOR WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY (2014);
Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the United Nations High
Commission for Human Rights: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/CRP.4 (Mar. 16, 2017).

